Trust, Information Acquisition and Financial Decisions: A Field Experiment by Sonia Di Giannatale et al.
1 
 
Trust, Information Acquisition and Financial 
Decisions: A Field Experiment 
 
Sonia Di Giannatale* 
Alexander Elbittar** 
Patricia López Rodriguez*** 
María José Roa**** 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the relationship between financial decisions, information acquisition, and 
trust. In particular, our hypothesis is that financial transactions depend, among other variables, on 
the level of trust, reciprocity and association among individuals. Also, individuals’ willingness to 
acquire and process information relevant to perform financial transactions is related not only to 
their cognitive abilities, but also to the level of trust they have in the financial institutions. We 
conducted a field experiment using the trust game, with two important variations, with the partners 
of an of credit and savings cooperative located in a rural area of México. Our results indicate that 
those individuals who frequently visit their friends show greater willingness to trust other 
individuals. In contrast, those individuals who visit their families more regularly show less 
willingness to reciprocate, while active members of the cooperative show greater reciprocity. 
Regarding the acquisition of information, we find that just over 2/3 of the participants buy the 
maximum of pieces of information. However, none of the pieces of information acquired appears to 
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1. Introduction  
 
The structure of financial markets is determined by information acquisition costs, 
transaction costs and contract enforcement costs (Levine, 2005). In particular, 
information acquisition costs are relevant in credit markets because asymmetric 
information between the borrower and the lender can lead to adverse selection 
problems, in which the lender is unable to distinguish between types of borrowers, 
and moral hazard problems, in which there is a probability that the borrower does 
not pay the money back to the lender. These types of informational problems arise 
in credit markets of both developed and developing economies, being the latter 
more adversely affected by those problems. The role of financial markets in the 
process of economic development has been largely discussed by some authors; see, 
for example, Ray (1998). In general, the financial systems of developing countries 
are characterized by high levels of the three types of costs mentioned above. 
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that their financial institutions are less 
efficient than those of the developed countries in fulfilling the objectives of the 
financial system such as risk diversification, information production, and allocation 
and supervision of investment resources (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, there is ample evidence in the literature that social 
networks and trust play a role in reducing problems of asymmetric information, 
more so in developing countries, by complementing or substituting formal financial 
markets and institutions (Townsend, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 2001; Adato et al., 2006; 
Chantarat and Barret, 2007).  The central idea is that social networks develop 
direct monitoring mechanisms that produce information about the financial 
behavior of the individuals that belong to such networks. Also, social networks 
tend to use social sanctions to improve the enforcement of contracts. Hence, social 
networks might play a role in reducing the informational costs inherent to the 
financial sector. Furthermore, this literature sustains that the operation of financial 
institutions is always ─regardless of the degree of development─ based on trust.  
Trust and social networks can improve the efficiency of a society by facilitating the 
coordination of actions (Putnam, 1993). Furthermore, according to Guiso et al. 
(2001) and Ferrary (2003), the existence of social networks and trust translates 
into greater degrees of development and institutionalization of the financial sector.  
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However, some articles (Uzzi, 1996; La Porta et al., 1997a, b; Guiso et al., 
2001), based on Fukuyama (1995), state that in societies where family networks 
prevail, the emergence of large companies and impersonal organizations, frequently 
observed in developed societies, might show delays. They maintain that family 
businesses reduce transparency in view of external investors or partners, and that 
the prevalence of this type of networks is one of the reasons behind the existence of 
a strong, inefficient informal financial sector in developing countries. Other articles 
support the idea that networks characterized by the existence of close ties between 
culturally similar individuals provide a strong basis from which democratic and 
efficient hierarchical institutions emerge (Titeca and Vervisch, 2008). 
 
In this paper we analyze the interaction and relationship between financial 
decisions, information acquisition, and trust. In particular, we work with the 
hypothesis that financial transactions depend not only on economic variables but 
also on variables such as the level of trust, reciprocity and association among 
individuals. Also, individuals’ willingness to acquire and process information 
relevant to perform financial transactions is related not only to their cognitive 
abilities, but also to the level of trust they have in the financial institutions. 
 
The experimental protocol known in the literature as the trust or investment 
game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) has been used to measure the degree of 
trust and reciprocity between the players. This game has been implemented in 
laboratories as well as in the field. Karlan (2005) conducted a field experiment in 
Peru in which individuals played the trust or investment game, and found that the 
strategies of one type of players correlate with some measures of social capital 
identified as trust. 
 
In order to simultaneously study the role of trust and information acquisition 
behavior when individuals perform financial transactions, we conducted a field 
experiment using the trust or investment game with two important variations, as 
well as a survey with the objective of gathering prior information about the 
potential participants in the field experiment. Our unit of analysis is Caja Mixtlán, 
an of credit and savings cooperative located in the mountains of the state of 
Jalisco, Mexico. This cooperative has been functioning for over 50 years and serves 
a rural population in a situation of poverty. We expect the information acquisition 
behavior to be the highlight of our analysis on financial decision making of this 
population that is a fairly closed community with supposedly strong ties among 
family members and cooperative partners. That is, given the characteristics of this 4 
 
community, our hypothesis is that trust is an important component in the process 
of the individuals’ financial decision making, while information acquisition, being 
an activity that for our experimental subjects is costly and in which they are very 
likely to be inexperienced, is performed more tentatively and with little 
sophistication. It is possible that for those individuals trust plays an overextended 
role in financial decision making that makes information acquisition less relevant 
than it is for other types of individuals making the same sort of decisions. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present a brief description of 
our unit of analysis; in Section 3, we describe our methodology; in Section 4, we 
present some of our results; and, in Section 5, we offer some concluding remarks. 
2. Description of the Unit of Analysis: Caja Mixtlán  
 
We undertook our study based on Caja Mixtlán, an of credit and savings 
cooperative belonging to the UNISAP Federation that is located in the Mexican 
state of Jalisco. We decided to work within the Mexican financial hierarchy, 
depicted in Figure 1, in order to analyze the financial decisions of individuals in a 
framework that includes the possibility of horizontal and vertical social netwoks. 
We chose the UNISAP Federation because it is one of the federations with greatest 
financial development and heterogeneity. We specifically selected Caja Mixtlán 
because it is one of the cooperatives with greatest diversity in terms of the 
population it serves, and because it has been operating for more than 50 years. 
Caja Mixtlán is located in a rural area and offers financial services to a population 
in a situation of poverty.  
 
We use the cluster sampling methodology and select the sampling units taking 
into account their levels of access to the financial services of Caja Mixtlán. We 
consider four clusters: Caja Mixtlán’s main office (Mixtlán), two branches (Talpa 
and Atenguillo) and a mobile branch (La Laja).1 
 
The Talpa and Atenguillo branches are located approximately 21 km and 23 
kms. from the main office in Mixtlán and have some 35 and 197 partners, 
                                                            
1 We have to highlight that these communities are heterogeneous. Talpa is the more developed 
community because it has the higher level of commercial activity generated by the Sanctuary of the 
Virgin of Talpa and a factory of guava products. La Laja is a very remote community located in the 
mountains and does not have any commercial activity. 5 
 
respectively. La Laja mobile branch is a meeting point at a distant town, about 145 
kms.  from Mixtlán, where the partners (approximately 154) perform their financial 
transactions with Caja Mixtlán  through a representative of the institution who 
travels to La Laja once a week. 
 
The unit of selection and observation consists of the partners of each of the 
clusters. We take as our primary unit of analysis the partners who are heads of a 
household. We define the head of a household as the individual who makes the 
financial decisions within the household. If the head of the household was absent at 
the sampling moment, we consider the spouse or the second adult (18 years or 
older) in charge of the household.  From a universe of around 1,066 active partners 
belonging to Caja Mixtlán, we selected a sample of 418 partners. By cluster, the 
sample is of approximately 195 partners in Mixtlán, 104 in Talpa, 108 in La Laja, 
and 11 in Atenguillo.   
 
The clusters are located in rural communities in which most of the partners are 
engaged in activities related to agriculture, livestock, services and small retail 
businesses. This population is characterized by high levels of migration to the 
United States or to nearby cities (Guadalajara or Puerto Vallarta), so there are 
cases where partners are registered in Caja Mixtlán but do not live in the locality. 
To ensure the presence of partners in the locality at the moment of sampling, the 
sample size was reduced to registered partners who live in the locality and that 
were present at the time of applying the methodology.  
3. Methodology  
 
Our field work started with a survey that was applied to 108 members of Caja 
Mixtlán from October the 6th until October the 10th, 2008.2 The sampling dates 
were selected to ensure the presence of a higher number of migrants in the locality. 
Although they are not present in their communities throughout the year, we 
considered it important to capture information from migrant partners because the 
level of their financial transactions with Caja Mixtlán is high due to the 
                                                            
2 Both the survey and the experimental activity were carried on dates of local holidays in which the 
migrants tend to go back to their communities of origin. 6 
 
remittances they send when they are away. Moreover, the reception of remittances 
is an important source of financial transactions in the Caja Mixtlán.  
 
The survey consists of 80 questions divided in two sections. In the first section 
we collect data on the personal, financial and socio-economic characteristics of the 
individuals. This section also collects information about their levels of participation 
in social networks and of trust in other individuals, in Caja Mixtlán, and in some 
governmental institutions; these questions were based on those of the General 
Social Survey. In the second section, we ask each respondent to specify the 
amounts of money that he would return to a potential sender (Type A individual) 
conditional on the several possible monetary amounts this individual could send in 
return. Respondents were notified that their responses could be taken into 
consideration at the moment of assigning payments to them in case of their being 
selected for the field experiment a posteriori.3 
 
Table 1 shows a distribution of the general characteristics of the population 
reported in the survey. From the survey results, we can infer that the degree of 
acquaintanceship and trust are important in financial decision-making. Closed 
social networks (relatives and friends) prevail in these communities. On the other 
hand, we observe that there is  limited  use of a variety of financial services on the 
part of the partners of Caja Mixtlán. Most of the individuals reported that they 
save in Caja Mixtlán, and only a very low percentage reported having accounts in 
other formal financial institutions. The percentage of partners that reported saving 
in informal financial institutions is also very low. Thus, partners are characterized 
by low levels of financial diversification and sophistication. The answers to the 
questions associated with membership and participation in activities of Caja 
Mixtlán show that this institution has a fundamental role in the creation of social 
networks among the partners and with its authorities. When asked directly, most 
of the partners reported that they would not participate in another credit and 
savings cooperative for trust-related reasons4 and almost all indicated that they feel 
Caja Mixtlán has benefited the community.  
 
                                                            
3 This type of questioning about monetary quantities to be returned conditional on the received 
amount is known as strategic form answer.  
4 In percentage terms, 18.12% of the surveyed members save in a bank , 1.18% of them have 
investment funds, and 13.97%  of them participate in informal savings institutions.  7 
 
Once the information collected in the survey had been processed, our second 
step was to undertake the field experiment from January the 12th to January the 
16th, 2009.  The experiment was applied to 69 members of the population initially 
surveyed. 
 
The field experiment implemented for this study consists of a variant of the 
protocol known in the literature as the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 
1995). In this game, a type A individual has the task of deciding how much money 
to send to a type B individual, who is anonymous, and how much of an initial 
capital to keep.  The type B individual receives the amount sent by the type A 
individual multiplied by three. Then, the type B individual decides how much 
money he wants to return to the type A individual and how much money he wants 
to retain. The amount of money which may be received and retained by any of the 
two types of individuals is a decision that is exclusive to the subjects of the 
experiment. That is, they do not receive suggestions or pre-established rules that 
might lead them to behave in a specific way.5  
 
The results of this experiment have been interpreted in the literature as a 
measure of the degree of trust and reciprocity that can exist between types A and 
B individuals. To observe these types of behavior among individuals, it is necessary 
that the type A individual transfer resources to the type B individual, trusting to 
receive some future return, and that the type B individual act reciprocally by 
transferring resources back to the type A individual (Camerer, 2003).   Thus, the 
quantity sent by the type A individual is considered to be a measure of trust and 
the amount returned by the type B individual is considered to be a measure of 
reciprocity.  
 
With the objective of studying the effect of knowing certain information about 
the type B individual on the monetary quantities sent initially by the type A 
individual, we introduced two important variants to the original game. First, the 
type A individual has the opportunity to send money to three different type B 
individuals. Second, the type A individual has the opportunity to acquire 
information about some relevant features of each type B individual. The acquisition 
of information about these features has a cost. The type A individual receives an 
                                                            
5 See the Appendix A for the script of the experiment. 8 
 
initial amount of money which he may or may not use for the purchase of 
information. 
 
To implement this activity we designed an activity book in which each of the 69 
participants was given the possibility of acting as a type A individual and deciding 
the different amounts he could send to three possible type B individuals. In 
addition, participants were shown a set of pieces of information about type B 
individuals, which the type A individuals could acquire (up to a maximum of five 
pieces) before making their decisions about monetary quantities to be sent to the 
type B individuals. Once the type A individuals decided the amounts to be sent to 
the three possible type B individuals, one type B individual was chosen at random 
and we looked at how he had answered the question on the initial survey as to the 
amount of money he would send back to the type A individual in case of receiving 
that specific monetary quantity. 
 
The amount of money given to the type A individuals was 300 Mexican pesos. 
Those individuals could send multiples of 50 from 0 to 300 Mexican pesos. They 
also received a payment of 50 Mexican pesos that they could use, if they wished, to 
buy information about type B individuals.6 The cost of each piece of information 
was 10 Mexican pesos. 
 
Table 4 shows the list of features about type B individuals that type A 
individuals could buy. We considered demographic, financial and social network 
participation characteristics. Including those variables enables us to analyze the 
hypothesis that social variables are relevant when individuals make financial 
decisions. To construct the list of pieces of information we took as a starting point 
a series of questions included in the survey in which partners of Caja Mixtlán were 
asked about factors that were relevant for them when lending or borrowing money. 
Those factors which appeared most often, along with some control variables, were 
included in the list of pieces of information that the type A individuals could 
purchase.7 
                                                            
6 The simultaneous implementation of this protocol without the possibility of acquiring information 
about type B individuals would allow us to study the relationship between anonymity and the 
degree of cooperation between types A and B individuals. 
7 Monetary amounts returned by type B individuals are obtained from the answers to the questions 





In this section we present and discuss our principal results.  
 
4.1 Transfers made by type A individuals 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of payments sent by type A individuals. Even 
though the mode of the payments was 100 Mexican pesos, the average and median 
were approximately 152 Mexican pesos, with a standard error of 6 Mexican pesos. 
This heterogeneity in the decisions as to the amount of the original payments 
contrasts with the results observed in laboratories with students as experimental 
subjects, in which  cases payments are relatively constant  at approximately  half 
of the capital available (Camerer, 2003).  
 
To estimate the characteristics that are relevant for the type A individuals 
when deciding the amount of money to be sent to type B individuals, we use the 
ordinary-least-squares model with random effects. 
 
As can be observed in Table 6, among the personal features of type A 
individuals that seemed to affect the amounts they transferred was whether they 
have bank accounts and with what frequency they visit friends. Specifically, 
individuals who reported having a bank account tended to send 55 Mexican pesos 
more than those who reported not having a bank account. Those who reported 
visiting their friends regularly tended to send 39 Mexican pesos more than those 
who reported visiting their friends rarely or never. 
 
Even though home owners tended to send more and those who bought two to 
five pieces of information tended to send smaller amounts of money, the coefficients 
are not significant.  
4.2 Information purchased by type A individuals 
 
Table 3 reports the distribution of the number of characteristics of type B 
individuals purchased by type A individuals. As can be observed, more than 2/3 of 
the individuals in the sample decided to buy the five pieces of information and only 
6 % of them decided not to find out anything about the type B individuals.  10 
 
 
In Table 4 we show the distribution of features of type B individuals that could 
be purchased by type A individuals. The first five features include: the employment 
status of of the individual (75 %), location (55 %), membership in Caja Mixtlán 
(48%), household income (45 %), and educational level (33 %). Thus, individuals 
were not only interested in financial variables. Participation in Caja Mixtlán and 
the proximity to their community were also relevant variables. However, as seen in 
Table 5, t-tests for differences between populations show that there is no significant 
relation between these variables and the amounts of money sent. As noted in the 
previous section, the number of pieces of information purchased does not prove to 
be significant in the decisions of type A individuals as to how much money they 
sent to the type B individuals.  
4.3 Conditional Amounts type B individuals return given the 
transfers of type A individuals 
 
Table 8 reports the average monetary amounts type B individuals received from 
and returned to type A individuals, the amounts retuned being conditional on the 
amounts received. As shown in this table, type B individuals tended to return 
monetary amounts that increased in accordance with the amounts they received 
from type A individuals. However, the average retention for each of the possible 
transfers from type A individuals is quite stable, at an average of 58 % of the 
amount received. The monetary amounts that type B individuals returned to type 
A individuals was greater than the amounts that type A individuals had originally 
sent. This result contrasts with experiments in developed countries where type B 
individuals tend to return less money than the transfer sent by type A individuals 
that amount has been tripled. In our study the average rate of return for type A 
individuals is approximately 27% of the amount originally sent. 
 
Table 7 shows the personal characteristics reported by type B individuals that 
affect the conditional amounts they returned to type A individuals. Active partners 
of Caja Mixtlán8 and individuals who live in Atenguillo returned higher amounts 
(63 Mexican pesos more). The individuals that reported visiting their relatives 
                                                            
8 We consider that active partners of Caja Mixtlán are those partners who attend the meetings 
organized by the authorities of Caja Mixtlán and make frequent use of the financial services offered 
by Caja Mixtlán. 11 
 
frequently returned 36 Mexican pesos less. Participants who are returned smaller 
amounts of money, but this variable is not significant in the regression. Older 
people returned less up until a minimum, after which the amount of money 
returned increased. 9 
5 Discussion and future research 
 
Our experimental results highlight the interest that individuals show in acquiring 
specific information on the financial status and participation in social networks of 
other people with whom they may establish financial transactions. Just over 2/3 of 
the participants purchased the maximum number of five pieces of information. 
Only 6% of the subjects decided not to buy any information. However, we have 
found no evidence that the information acquired had any impact on the amounts 
type A individuals sent to type B individuals. This result allows us to conclude 
that the acquisition of the pieces of information offered to the participants has 
little impact on their financial decision making process, a process that is based on 
pre-existent levels of trust among the individuals who are immersed in vertical and 
horizontal social networks. 
 
The broad support of the distribution of the transfers type A individuals send 
to type B individuals highlights the heterogeneity of individuals’ preferences with 
respect to the agreements based on trust they wish to reach. At the same time, the 
degree of concentration around the range between 100 and 150 Mexican pesos 
provides us with a basis for further research. With respect to the behavior of type 
B individuals, we find a high degree of reciprocity compared with that found in 
studies of a similar nature conducted in developed countries. Preferences for 
reciprocity are fairly homogeneous. We also find that those individuals who meet 
with friends more often show greater trust. However, the individuals that 
frequently visit their relatives show a lower level of reciprocity. The active 
members of Caja Mixtlán show a greater level of reciprocity, which reinforces the 
perception that the cooperative plays a role in the formation of social networks in 
this community. This conclusion is along the lines of some of the results of Titeca 
and Vervisch (2008) who find that community associations might provide a basis 
for the creation of hierarchical institutions. 
 
                                                            
9 The level of significance of this variable is 10%. 12 
 
We can thus conclude that in locations where closed social networks prevail, 
financial transactions depend not only on economic variables but also on other 
variables such as individual’s level of trust, reciprocity and association. Another 
point is that in communities like those involved in this study, the level of 
sophistication of the use of information when making financial decisions and of the 
diversity of financial instruments they use and, concomitantly, the degree of 
financial development tends to be low. In general, the level of trust seems to be 
high, although preferences over trust are quite heterogeneous. Moreover, for the 
case of our experimental subjects, trust seems to overlap the role of information 
acquisition while making financial decisions, because they seem interested in 
acquiring information but they do not use the information they purchase in their 
financial decision making relying on pre-existent levels of trust they have in the 
individuals of their social group. 
 
To have a better map of individuals’ preferences on trust and reciprocity and of 
the impact of new information on their financial decisions and economic 
cooperation agreements, it is necessary to study other populations. For this reason, 
and given the differences in the level of development between rural and urban 
areas, we intend to apply this methodology in different regions within Mexico to 
capture the dynamic element in our idea about the relationship between financial 
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Appendix A: Experimental instructions 
The following is the verbatim translation (from Spanish into English) of the experimental 
instructions administered to subjects (the Spanish original is available from the authors 
upon request).  
Script for the experimental sessions 
•  Mark starting time  
 
1.  Introduction  
 
•  Start thanking for the participation. 
•  Show disposition to clarify any doubt or question. 
•  Give payment of $ 50 for agreeing to participate without any commitment. 
•  Indicate that participation is voluntary at all times.
•  Inform that we are members of a research center at a University institution.
•  Inform that we are not member of the Government or any political party.   
•  Inform that the study is only for academic purpose. 
•  Warn that the questions and their answer will not compromise their rights.
•  Ensure that we guarantee the confidentiality of their responses. 
•  Point out that the questions have no correct or incorrect response. 
•  Point out that we are only interested in their decisions.    
•  Describe the study: This is a study about how people make decisions with money.  
•  Show the activity book, with which they can earn an additional amount of money.  
•  Ask whether they have any questions?    
•  Consent question: Can we start?   
 
2.  Starting the activity book and warning about the comprehension of the instructions 
 
•  Show the activity book.    
•  Inform that it is of our interest that they understand the instructions.    
•  Warn them that they can stop us if there is something unclear from the explanation.    
 
3.  General description of the activity, of how the activity to be paid for will be chosen, and of how 
the payment will be made 
Activity  
In this activity you will make decisions that involve others participants. This activity is done in 
pairs. The result of this activity will depend on decisions made separately and the decisions made 
by you and the other three participants of the study, whom we will call: B1, B2 and B3.   
You will never know who these participants are. They will never know who you are.   You may 
know some characteristics of these people before making your decision. To know some of these 
features (if desired) you may purchase them using the 50 pesos we gave you at the start. You will 
also know the decision made by any of these participants. However, you will know the latter at the 
end of the study when you have already made all your decisions.   18 
 
 
•  Go at the end of the book and show the three boxes of decision  
 
4.  Method of payment  
To pay you for this activity, one of your decisions will be randomly chosen using a dice. After you 
finish making your decisions, we will throw a dice:  
i.  If the number is 1 or 2, we will choose for your payment your decision related to the 
participant B1.    
ii.  If the number is 3 or 4, we will choose for your payment your decision related to the 
participant B2. 
iii.  If the number is 5 or 6, we will choose for your payment your decision related to the 
participant B3.  
[Check that the subject understood the procedure by asking the following question: For example, let 
throw the dice. The number that appeared is number _ [The participant answer], therefore the 
decision chosen for your payoff will be the one you made related to participant _ [The participant 
answer]]  
Any side of the dice can occur. You will not know what the other participants’ decisions are before 
throwing the dice.  
Make your decision regarding each subject as if it is the one you are going to be paid for. Thus, if 
this participant is selected, you will have taken the decision that has seemed better. There is no 
right or wrong answer. 
Do you have any question?    
[If he/she has questions, explain again.]   
[Explain using diagrams in pages 2 and 3]   
Person A  
In this activity you are going to be a person A and each of the other participants will be identified 
as persons B1, B2 and B3.   
This page is only an example, but it is equal to the one in which you will have to mark your 
responses. We will begin our example explaining the activity with a person who we call simply 
person B.    
You will start with $300 pesos that our study is giving to you to decide how much of that money 
you want to send to person B. The money you send is multiplied by three, so that person B will 
receive three times the amount that you send. That is, for every $1 peso you send to person B, the 
study will give $2 additional pesos and, consequently, person B will receive $3 in total.  
Person B may return to you some, all or nothing of the money received, but the money that person 
B return to you will not be multiplied.  
Thus you will win what you have saved from the initial $300 plus what person B had decided to 
send you back.   
Do you have any questions?   
Now I am going to explain you how you will tell us your answer and how we will know the response 
of person B. Here we have 7 pictures, representing 7 quantities you can send to person B.   
[Show each picture and explain each of them]   
The first possibility is that you save the $300 pesos and send nothing to person B. If you choose this 
option, person B would receive nothing, and therefore not could return anything to you.   19 
 
The second option that you have is to stay with $250 and send $50 your partner. In that case, 
person B would receive $150 ($50 x 3) and your income would be $250 plus what person B decides 
to return to you.   
[Continue explaining likewise all options.]  
[Speed and detail explanation depend on cognitive abilities of the participant].   
What we will ask you to do is to decide how much money you want to send to your partner ($ 0, $ 
50, $ 100, $ 150, $ 200, $ 250 or $ 300).    
When sending money to different partners, the quantities that you send to each partner B1, B2 or 
B3 can be equal or different. It is your decision.   
To indicate your decision of how much you have decided to send to each partner you must enclose 
in a circle the corresponding answer. You must choose only one option; the one you like the best.   
[Make a graphical demonstration.]   
For example, suppose that I am a person A (like you) and I want to send $100 to person B. Then I 
would circle this option.  
It is very important that you notice that the money you earn for this activity will depend on how 
much money you keep and on how much money your partner, person B, will return to you.   
Now, how are we going to know who your partner is and how much money he has returned?   
I brought with me a list with the decisions of other people who have already participated in the 
study. These people played the role of person B. When you finish answering and we select the 
corresponding partner, then I will pull out the list and look for the decision of the selected person.  
You will not know what the responses from those people are before you make your own decisions; 
you will not know who your final partner is because the person's name is not mentioned in the list.   
Once you know the chosen partner we will open the list to see how much money he/she returned.   
[Give the explanation using the corresponding pages.]   
And how can we know what he/she responded? This page is an example of the sheet that person B 
responded. The page has seven amounts he/she responded and they correspond to the seven 
drawings you have on your answer sheet.   
Just as you do not know at this time what your partner decided, when person B responded he/she 
didn't know how much money you had sent him/her. Then person B had to say, for each quantity 
that you can send him/her, how much money he/she would return. Thus, for any amount you 
decide to send, we will know how much money will be returned.    
[Make graphical explanation.]   
For example, suppose that I am a person B and that I say: "If my partner, person A, does not send 
me anything, then I don't receive anything and I cannot return anything" (This is why $0 is already 
written with a gray circle)  
Then I would go to the next option and would say "If person A sends me $50 I would receive $150 
($ 50 x 3) and then return you, say, $ 100".   
Then I would go to the next option and would say "If person A sends me $ 100 I would receive $300 
($ 100 x 3) and then return you, say, $ 200".   
[Go ahead with the example, using the quantities $ 200, $ 300 and $ 400 for the following three 
decisions.]   
Now, imagine that you sent to person B the amount of $100 used in the example and that this 
person is selected for your payment. Let's imagine that we open the list and see that person B 
responded as in this example.  
What would have happened? How much money would have returned to you your partner?   20 
 
If you look carefully, this person B said that if person A sent him $100 he or she would return $200. 
Then how much would you win? $400: the $200 you saved originally plus the $200 that person B 
returned.   
And how much does person B win? $100: $300 that he/she received minus the $200 that returned 
(remember that person B had received $300 because $100 that person A sent would have been 
multiplied by 3).   
Do you have any questions? Remember that person B can return what he or she want: some, all or 
nothing of what you sent.   
[Write new examples on the same pages.]  
[The second example is mandatory but others depend on whether the participant seems to need 
them].   
For example, person B might return nothing. [Explain what would happen.] Or he/she could have 
returned $0, $50, $100, $150, $200, etc.  Is it clear?  
Now, remember that these are only examples. You can choose to send to any of the partners 
(participants B1, B2 and B3) the amount you prefer within these seven options; and your partners 
(participants B1, B2 and B3) can return you what they want to.   
[Switch to the worksheet of partners’ features.]   
Buying features’ information  
Before making your decisions you may know some information about some features of these people. 
You can choose up to 5 characteristics of these people. The features that you may know of these 
people are the following: his/her age, gender, whether he/she is married, his/her level of education, 
his/her employment status, his/her income, whether he/she has any of the following goods: phone, 
cell phone, refrigerator, heating gas, television, video or DVD player, washing machine, vehicle, 
microwave oven, Sky or cable; whether owns his/her home; whether he/she has a Bank account; 
whether he/she helps the cooperative; whether he/she lives or not in the same town.   
If you are interested in knowing some of these features, you simply tell me and I will give you this 
information for each of your partners.  Each feature has a cost of 10 pesos, which may be paid using 
the 50 pesos we gave you at the beginning. You can purchase 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, or 0 characteristics of 
your partners.   
For example, if you decide to know his/her gender, I will give you the information whether the 
person B1 is a woman or a man, whether the person B2 is a woman or a man and whether the 
person B3 is a woman or a man. This information will cost 10 pesos. Similarly, any other 
information you want to know will cost 10 pesos.    
I am going to ask before we move on to make your decisions marking with an X the features you 
want to know about these people.   
[Given the chosen features, fill the characteristics of these people sheet]    
We will then turn the page and I am going to ask that you enclose the amount of money you want 
to send to each of your partners in a circle. Let's start by the B1 couple. We will then move to the 
B2 and finally the couple B3. Remember that you can only choose one for each pair.   
[Perform the payment procedure]   
We now come to the payment procedure. 
    
•  Mark the end time  
 
















Folio Time Day Month  Year #




Person A decides  
Example: Decisions regarding person B 
Mark with an X the amount you want to send to Person B. (  = $50) 




      
        
Person A       Person B 
$300      $0 
        (3 x $0) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B 
$250      $150 
        (3 x $50) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B 
$200      $300 
        (3 x $300) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B 
$150      $450 
        (3 x $150) 23 
 




    
        
Person A       Person B 
$100      $600 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B 
$50      $750 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B 
$0     $900 
        (3 x $300) 
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Example: Person B’s decisions  
 
Person A       Person B 
$300 + $0        $0 - $0 
 
 
        
 Return  $0     
       
Person A       Person B 
$250 + $        $150 - $ 
 
 
        
 Return  $     
       
Person A       Person B 
$200 + $        $300 - $ 
 
 
        
 Return  $     
       
Person A       Person B 
$150 + $        $450 - $ 
 
 
        
 Return  $     
       
 
  25 
 
Person A       Person B 
$100 + $        $600 - $ 
 
 
        
 Return  $     
       
Person A       Person B 
$50 + $        $750 - $ 
 
 
        
 Return  $     
       
Person A       Person B 
$0 + $        $900 - $ 
 
 
        
 Return  $     
       
 26 
 
Information about partners 
Mark with an X the characteristics you want to know about persons B1, B2 
and B3 
 
# Information  Interested  No  interested 
1  Lives in the locality     
2  Owns a gas stove     
3  Employed / Unemployed     
4 Education  level     
5  Holds a bank account     
6  Owns a vehicle     
7  Owns a TV     
8  Meets with friends (how often)     
9  Owns a cell phone     
10 Marital  status     
11  Owns a washing machine     
12 Homeowner  or  not     
13  Receives cable or satellite TV     
14 
Whether has asked for/received   
government aid 
  
15  Owns a telephone     
16 




Whether is an active member of the 
cooperative 
  
18 Gender     
19 Age     
20  Owns a refrigerator     
21 
Whether visits a family member (how 
often) 
  
22  Owns of a microwave oven     
23  Owns of a video or DVD player     
24  Level of household income     
 
Number of characteristics: _________ 
   27 
 
Person A decides  
Decision respect person B1. Mark with an X the amount of money you want 
to send to person B1. (  = $50) 




      
        
Person A       Person B1 
$300      $0 
        (3 x $0) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B1 
$250      $150 
        (3 x $50) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B1 
$200      $300 
        (3 x $300) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B1 
$150      $450 
        (3 x $150) 





    
        
Person A       Person B1 
$100      $600 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B1 
$50      $750 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B1 
$0     $900 
        (3 x $300) 
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Person A decides  
Decision respect person B2 
Mark with an X the amount of money you want to send to person B2. (  = 
$50) 




      
        
Person A       Person B2 
$300      $0 
        (3 x $0) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B2 
$250      $150 
        (3 x $50) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B2 
$200      $300 
        (3 x $300) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B2 
$150      $450 
        (3 x $150) 30 
 




    
        
Person A       Person B2 
$100      $600 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B2 
$50      $750 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B2 
$0     $900 
        (3 x $300) 
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Person A decides  
Decision respect person B3 
Mark with an X the amount of money you want to send to person B3. (  = 
$50) 




      
        
Person A       Person B3 
$300      $0 
        (3 x $0) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B3 
$250      $150 
        (3 x $50) 
        




      
        
Person A       Person B3 
$200      $300 
        (3 x $300) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B3 
$150      $450 
        (3 x $150) 32 
 




    
        
Person A       Person B3 
$100      $600 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B3 
$50      $750 
        (3 x $200) 
        




    
        
Person A       Person B3 
$0     $900 
        (3 x $300) 
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Amount kept   
+  Amount 













Amount kept   





































Table 1: Distribution of socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed 







     Experiment 
   N  n/N  n  n/N 
Total of individuals (N)  108     69    
Locality             
Mixtlán 54 50.0  % 27 39.1  % 
Atenguillo 19 17.6  % 16 23.2  % 
Talpa 17 15.7  % 13 18.8  % 
The Laja 18 15.9  % 13 18.8  % 
Membership in Caja 
Mixtlán             
Yes 96 88.9  % 62 89.9  % 
Not 12  11.1  % 7 10.1  % 
Employment Status              
Employed 73 67.6  % 51 73.9  % 
Unemployed 35 32.4  % 18 26.1  % 
Marital Status             
Single 20 18.5  % 12 17.4  % 
Married 71 65.7  % 45 65.2  % 
Other 17 15.7  % 12 17.4  % 
Home Owner             
Yes 84  77.8 %  52  75.4 5 
No 24 22.2  % 17 24.6  % 
Level of education             
Pre-school or without 
education 7 6.5  % 2 2.9  % 
Primary 46 42.6  % 31 44.9  % 
Secondary and Senior 
High School 41 38.0  % 25 36.2  % 
Professional 14 13.0  % 11 15.9  % 
Gender             
Female 72 66.7  % 50 72.5  % 
Male 36 33.3  % 19 27.5  % 
Meetings with family             36 
 
members 
Very Frequent or 
Frequent 78 72.2  % 48 69.6  % 
Infrequent or None 30 27.8  % 21 30.4  % 
Meetings with friends             
Very Frequent or 
Frequent 60 55.6  % 36 52.2  % 
Infrequent or None 48 44.4  % 33 47.8  % 
Government Support             
High or intermediate level 29 26.9  % 14 20.3  % 
Little or none 79 74.1  % 55 79.7  % 
Bank Account             
Yes 18 15.9  % 13 18.8  % 
Not 90 83.3  % 56 81.2  % 
Household Income 
(Mexican pesos per 
month)             
Average 7321    8419     
Standard error 83     128    
Age             
Average 46    47     
Standard error 0.14     2    
Amount Sent             
Average n.d.     152    
Standard error n.d.     6    











Table 2: Distribution of money transfers by Type A  individuals   
  
Amount  N  n/N 
0 6  3  % 
50 34  16  % 
100 58  28  % 
150 32  15  % 
200 34  16  % 
250 11  5  % 
300 32  15  % 
Total 207  100  % 
  
Table 3: Distribution of the number of characteristics Type B individuals 
purchased by Type A individuals  
  
Number of 
characteristics  N  n/N 
Amount 
sent 
0 4  6  %  263 
1 1  1  %  83 
2 3  4  %  122 
3 5  7  %  137 
4 7  10  %  176 
5 49  71  %  143 
Total 69  100  %  151 
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Table 4 : Distribution of of the characteristics Type B individuals purchased 
by Type A individuals  
  
Characteristic  N  n/N 
Employment Status  52  75 % 
Location 38  55  % 
Membership in Caja Mixtlán  33  48 % 
Household income  32  44 % 
Education 23  33  % 
Home owner  19  28 % 
Bank account holder  15  22 % 
Marital status  14  20 % 
Age 14  20  % 
Government aid applications  12  17 % 
Gender 10  14  % 
Visits friends  9  13 % 
Visits relatives  8  12 % 
Visits U.S.  4  5 % 
Car owner  3  4 % 
Phone line holder  3  4 % 
Stove owner  2  3 % 
Washing machine owner  2  3 % 
TV owner  1  1 % 
Refrigerator owner  1  1 % 
Cellular phone owner  0  0 % 
Cable subscriber  0  0 % 
Microwave owner  0  0 % 
DVD owner  0  0 % 
  39 
 









Employment Status   Home ownership 
Employed 151 100 Home  owner 145 43 
Unemployed 144  56
-
0.61
Non-home owner 133  14  -0.63
Location  Bank account holder
Different 135  70 Holder 158 12 
Same 146  44 0.62 Non-holder 130 33  -1.09
Membership Marital  Status 
Member  145  89 Divorce or wid. 141  6 
Non member  132  10
-
0.48
Married 193 28  1.56 
Household income  Single 136  8  -0.11
Const. 152  Age 
Average household 
income 
155 91 0.44 Const. 205 
Education Average  age 176  42  -0.85




Sec. & Bachill.  141  30
-
0.18
No 166  30 
Professional 179  8  1.22 Yes  128  6  -1.64
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Table 6: Estimates of amounts sent by Type A individuals to Type B 
individuals type conditional on of the characteristics Type B individuals  
  
Money Sent  Coef.  Err.STD. Z  P > z
Intercept  220.878 121.016 1.830  0.068
Locality             
Atenguillo -5.678 30.303 -0.190 0.851
Talpa -29.696 27.640 -1.070 0.283
The Laja 4.573 27.091 0.170  0.866
Membership in Caja Mixtlán (member = 1) -4.416 30.441 -0.150  0.885
Employment Status  (unemployed = 1)  8.866 21.804 0.410  0.684
Marital Status             
Single -16.380 38.729 -0.420 0.672
Married 35.978 30.886 1.160 0.244
Home Owner (no = 1)  -38.444 21.419 -1.790  0.073
Level of education             
Secondary and Preparatory 20.284 25.942 0.780  0.434
Professional 41.709 24.614 1.690  0.090
Gender (male = 1)  11.927 20.221 0.590  0.555
Bank Account (no = 1)  -59.176 22.528 -2.630  0.009
Age -1.122 3.843 -0.290  0.770
Age ^ 2  0.015 0.036 0.400  0.688
Frequent meetings with family  -32.692 19.414 -1680  0.092
Frequent meetings with friends  21.359 19.563 1.090  0.275
Frequent requests for government aid  1.552 24.238 0.060  0.949
Number of observations  207         
Number of groups  69         
Wald chi2 (22)  41         




Table 7: Response Function Estimates of the Type B individual monetary 
returns to Type A individuals  
  
Amount Returned by B  Coef.  Err.STD. Z  P > z
Intercept 177.651 109.874 1,620  0.106
E100  58.734 11.047 5.320  0.000
E150  66.585 11.047 6.030  0.000
E200  75.706 11.029 6.860  0.000
E250  26.459 10.998 2.410  0.016
E300  108.303 10.998 9.850  0.000
Locality             
Atenguillo 62.845 25.240 2.490  0.013
Talpa 13.583 24.057 0.560 0.572
The Laja 22.927 23.461 0.980  0.328
Membership in Caja Mixtlán (member = 1) 57.391 28.625 2,000  0.045
Employment Status (unemployed = 1)  11.906 18.771 0.630  0.526
Marital Status             
Single -39.966 30.458 -1.310 0.189
Married -30.610 25.291 -1.210 0.226
Home Owner (no = 1)  -25.439 19.796 -1.290  0.199
Level of education             
Secondary and Preparatory -3.042 20.824 -0.150  0.884
Professional -0.255 26.376 -0.010 0.992
Gender (male = 1)  18.928 18.648 1.020  0.310
Bank Account (no = 1)  -12.851 22.952 -0.560  0.576
Age  -5.988 3.541 -1.690  0.091
Age ^ 2  0.052 0,033 1.560  0.119
Frequent meetings with family  27.286 18.997 1.440  0.151
Frequent meetings with friends  -15.154 17.535 -0.860  0.387
Frequent requests for government aid   -17.493 18.656 -0.940  0.348
Number of observations  624         
Number of groups  105         
Wald chi2 (22)  1247         




Table 8: Average amounts that can be received and retain Type B individuals 
conditional on the transfers made by Type A individuals  
  
Conditional Amounts to be received 
and retained by Type B individuals 
Conditional Amounts conditional to 
be sent by Type A individuals 
50  100  150  200  250  300 
Amount received by B (Mexican pesos)  150 300 450 600  750  900
Amount retained by B (Mexican pesos)  87 179 261 336  462  500
Amount returned by B (Mexican  pesos)  63 121 189 264 288 400
                    
Amount received by B (%)  100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %  100 %  100 %
Amount retained by B (%)  58 % 60 % 58 % 56 %  62 %  56 %
Amount returned by B (%)  42 % 40 % 42 % 44 %  38 %  44 %
                    
The rate of return of A  conditional on the 
return of B (%)  27 % 21 % 26 % 32 %  15 %  33 %
  
 